The regional debate has occupied a pre-eminent place in political discussions in Catalonia for several years and both citizens and the political class have been engaged in fierce debate on the subject. Moves towards independence in Catalonia and the demands made by other parts of Spain have shaken up the national and regional issue and forced political parties to take positions and come up with proposals for accommodating demands for a pluri-national state and for regional decentralisation. This paper gives a perspective on how citizens and parties have changed their positions on Catalonia as a region and as a nation. Through the analysis of survey data and parties' manifesto proposals, we show the size of the political changes and the direction they have taken. The paper ends by setting out future scenarios for Spain's regional model and the main points of agreement and of disagreement among the various players.
INTRODUCTION
If a political analyst had examined Catalonia ten years ago and compared his findings with the situation now, he would find things had changed greatly. During the period of 2010-2016, many of the attitudes defining Catalan citizens have undergone a sea change. Political behaviour, which was fairly stable up until the end of the first decade of the 21st century, has undergone a remarkable transformation. The result is a new, much more complex panorama of political parties and very different political attitudes. The political analyst from the past would find today's society one scarred by the economic crisis. He would also find a society that was more politically mobilised and interested in politics.
That said, today's society is less willing to bend to the powers that be, not least because of the endless stream of corruption cases [affecting politicians in general and Spain's government in particular]. Last but not least, a sizeable chunk of Catalonia's citizenry has changed its preferences regarding the regional organisation of the state. Put another way, the number of citizens who support the regional status quo-Spain's so-called autonomous community model-is much lower than it was a decade ago.
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In today's fast-changing world, it is all too easy to overlook this sea-change in Catalan politics. This paper offers a panoramic analysis of the relationship between Catalonia and the Spanish State from the post-dictatorship institution of self-government. Two intertwined strands are examined. One is the change in citizens' attitudes, the other is how these attitudes have changed parties' discourses.
It is well-known in political science that citizens' attitudes and political discourse follow an endogenous process. Thus, it is hard to unpick citizens' views from political discourse, given that the latter often changes in the light of public opinion. We therefore warn the reader that this paper does not seek a causal mechanism explaining attitudinal and behavioural changes whether in the political elites or in the general public. Such an aim would require more sophisticated methods than those used here. Instead, the paper's aim is show the reader both the scope and the direction of the changes that have taken place during this period. This is important for we can only know whither we are bound if we know whence we have come. Hooghe et al., (2016) A trip through the corridors of power: the evolution of the regional debate in Catalonia of ideas on regional government and put off the roll out of self-government until after approval of Spain's Constitution and any decisions the Constitutional Tribunal might make. The model finally adopted cut back the initial proposals for self-government and was one in which central government kept the whip hand.
A CONFRONTATIONAL REGIONAL MODEL
Pressure from Spain's army and other key players also shaped the model: the idea was that its shortcomings could be dealt with later in a piecemeal fashion. powers in all regions, and a much lower level of shared governance. However, the model was also characterised by considerable instability in self-government given that it was fairly easy for the central government to re-assume powers whenever it saw fit (Guinjoan and Rodon, 2016) .
Thus, as shown in the Regional Authority Index, Catalonia's powers in relation to self-government (the ability to design its own policies in various fields), at least at the formal level, is slightly below While the regional model's ambiguity has given some flexibility when it comes to regional development and design, it is also true that Spain's system of 'autonomous communities' has become a legal minefield (Rodon, 2015b) . 
STABILITY AND TRENDS IN PUBLIC OPINION
Regional confrontation (whether politically articulated or through the courts) and the wish of Catalan parties to increase Catalonia's self-government, has been mirrored by trends in Catalan public opinion on the issue. • This distinction is important when weighing up the reasons that lead a given population segment to lend its support to one option or the other. While those with a strong preference for independence appeal to questions of cultural identity, those with weak preferences use other arguments such as management capabilities or the economy. By contrast, those who oppose independence are more likely to resort to arguments based on identity whether their preference happens to be strong or weak (Muñoz and Tormos, 2015) .
• The ideological position of those wanting independence is more left-wing than hitherto. Many of the arguments used by those advocating secession are based on improving living standards and policy management by institutions that are closer to citizens.
• Support for independence has grown throughout 
EVOLUTION OF THE CATALAN PARTY SYSTEM
Given the evolution of territorial preferences at the citizen level, we will now turn to the changing situation at the political level. The Catalan party system was very stable in the two decades following the recovery of Catalan self-government. The first legislatures (1980-1984 and 1984-988) saw the consolidation of five parliamentary groups, which stayed more or less unchanged for a long spell. These five parties can be split into two groups using the 'left' and 'right' division found in all Western democracies and the 'national' or 'territorial' aspect which splits the electorate's regional model preferences (Padró-Solanet i Colomer, 1992) The biggest party in the Catalan parliament was CiU, which dominated the political scene in the 1980s. CiU gained three consecutive absolute majorities (1984, 1988, and 1992 ) under the leadership of Jordi Pujol (Pallarès and Font, 1994; Pallarès, 1994) . The strong appeal of CiU's position on regional self-governance led to an interesting pattern, whereby most Catalans voted PSOE in general elections and CiU in the regional ones. In the last elections, if we consider voting figures, there are second-order effects. These include the fact that regional elections have a lower voter turn-out than national ones. In addition to dual-voting behaviour, one should also note the impact of differential abstention. This occurs when a large number of voters take part in the national elections but not in the regional ones (Montero and Font, 1991; Riba, 2008; Riera, 2009) and as a corollary of the first, there was a notable rise in political fragmentation and polarisation (Hernández and Kriesi, 2015) , a trend that can be seen throughout Western democracies (Thomassen and Ham, 2014) .
The CiU and the PSC gradually lost their leading role as voters were lured away by smaller parties that had gradually consolidated their position over the years.
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This did not mean that the dwindling parties became weaker as a result: Barberá, et al. (2009) , found that, paradoxically, this loss of voters was offset by greater internal strength.
3
2 We have already mentioned that CiU lost its pivotal role and then embarked on organisational restructuring-a process that is still underway at the time of writing. The 2010 election results and the electoral coalition with 'Junts pel Sí' [hereinafter 'JxS'] in 2015 were fairly good but did not give CiU an absolute majority. However the instability of the party system has had a big impact on the PSC. This party attained its peak support in 1999 (with 37.85% of the vote and 52 Members of Parliament) and in two tripartite coalition governments led by Maragall (2003 Maragall ( -2006 and Montilla (2006 Montilla ( -2010 . The emergence of new parties and tensions between the PSC and PSOE (the Catalan and Spanish socialist parties, respectively) slashed the PSC's share of the vote to just 12.72% , leaving the party with 16 seats. These dramatic losses would be offset by gains in the general and local elections.
3 In this respect, they reveal the importance of funding political parties through public sources rather than through members' subscriptions. (Barberá, et al., 2009) It is also an indicator of potential instability, given that the presence of more parties can make it harder to form governments. 4 In the Catalan case, this trend is clearly linked to the independence movement. However, it is also related to one of the biggest economic crises Catalonia has ever experienced.
If we look at the ideological axes (see Figure 8 and This dynamic is still clearly present in the legislature that followed the elections held on September 27, 2015.
While the JxS coalition, formed by the independent candidates CDC and ERC, allowed these two parties to put their electoral competition on ice, it does not mean they have stopped competing for political space. (Guinjoan, et al., 2013) . We will now analyse this evolution, first regarding the formation of a pro-independence bloc and then in connection with federalist parties.
A trip through the corridors of power: the evolution of the regional debate in Catalonia
The formation of a heterogeneous pro-independence bloc • The CiU: the party that had played a pre-eminent role in Catalan politics for many years, had put forward the gradual recovery of self-government as the best option. The federated party had always defended Catalonia's status as a nation but did not question the territorial unity of Spain-at least in the short term. The aim was to achieve greater regional self-government. However, from the tenth Party Congress onwards (held in 1996), pro-independence ideas began to gain ground and it was decided not to renounce self-determination because of the political leverage this gave. Catalonia has the right to decide its future.
The moment has come to exercise this right.
After thirty years, it is time to choose and for Catalonia to make its own path in a natural fashion. This path-a national transition-will allow us to make our own decisions and choose between the options we have. It means living better (CiU, 2012, p. 12).
The CiU (which had espoused regional autonomy for over thirty years) now defended a manifesto that put an end to its moderating role in Spanish politics:
"We want to build a broad social majority so that Catalonia can have its own State within the European framework, allowing us to take our rightful place among the nations of the world" (CiU, 2012, p. 12) .
Moreover, the party fully committed itself to consulting Catalonia's citizens on independence:
The Catalan Government will consult the Catalan people so that they can freely and democratically decide their collective future. 8 For an analysis of CiU's political programme, see Barrio (2014) . • The ERC: From the tripartite pact to JxS. As we have said, the ERC also took part in this joint candidacy.
The evolution of the republican electoral programme was also relevant during this period. That said, if one analyses the ERC's track record, the party opposed the 1978 Spanish Constitution because it did not enshrine the right to self-determination. Here, one should note that the ERC defined itself as an independent party at its 17th Congress, which was held in 1991, (ERC, 1991) . Thus, the evolution of the party's political programme has more to do with tactics at any given moment than with deep-seated changes in ideology.
A trip through the corridors of power: the evolution of the regional debate in Catalonia In this text, the party set out its political project as one that was "progressive and based on self-go- A trip through the corridors of power: the evolution of the regional debate in Catalonia
In the same programme, the party again advocated a referendum on Catalonia's constitutional future and reaching broad agreement on a constitutional process (CSQP, 2015, p. 211) .
Corollary: parliamentary consolidation of the independence movement
To sum up, the analysis of the manifestos presented by Second, the fragmentation and polarisation of parties is a trend that goes beyond Catalonia. This makes us think that these trends have an explanation that goes beyond the purely regional frame and may have played an important role.
The economic crisis is a factor that needs to be borne in mind when delving into the reasons for the political changes in Catalonia. Here, one should note that this factor has been cited as a major driver of change in other political systems over the last few years (Hernández and Kriesi, 2016) . While Catalan preferences on the regional government model began changing before the onset of the economic crisis and its fall-out, one cannot rule the crisis out as an important factor in this shift. Various hypotheses can be made in this respect. On the one hand, the crisis' impact on individuals' behaviour and opinions might have led to frustration being channelled into the issue of regional conflict with central government. On the other, one can also point to the way the economic crisis has helped the State pursue its recentralisation agenda. Here, the Spanish government has been able to seize upon ECB dictated austerity and bail-out terms to weaken regions' powers and regional funding (Viver, 2011) . of holding a referendum to give effect to 'The Right to Decide'. These circumstances were: the fact that the Catalan government was a minority one; the difficulty of making the elections plebiscitary (Orriols and Rodon, 2016) ; and the fact that pro-independence votes did not reach 50% of all those cast (which, as we mentioned, was the threshold defined as 'plebiscitary' by JxS). As we saw in the previous paragraph, the referendum proposal was not initially part of the 'route map' that is now being followed by the Catalan government. Yet it was argued that such a referendum would legitimise a subsequent Declaration of Independence and the application of transitional laws to constitute a new Catalan State.
Be that as it may, the radical shift in Catalan politics over the last decade is a fact. It not only mirrors changed preferences for regional government/secession but is also reflected in a more fragmented, polarised system of political parties. The pro-independence movement, which used to be a fringe phenomenon in parliamentary terms, now occupies centre stage in Catalan politics, together with 'The Right to Decide'.
